Abstract-An algorithm for finding minimum-weight words in large linear codes is developed. It improves all previous attacks on the public-key cryptosystems based on codes and it notably points out some weaknesses in McEliece's cipher. We also determine with it the minimum distance of some BCH codes of length 511.
followed by addition which is completed in one clock unit time. The DFT is computed using a systolic cell described in [15] . For IBA-1 and IBA-2 the computation of the common connection polynomial is done by processing rows or columns serially. The computations of the connection polynomials for individual rows or columns in the case of Blahut's 2-D burst error correction are done concurrently. Except for the MSTD, the B-M algorithm works in the spectral domain. For the MSTD, the time-domain B-M algorithm is employed and in this case all computations of the B-M algorithm for rows or columns are done concurrently. To simplify the matters, conjugacy constraints and fast computation algorithms for DFT are not taken into account. Table I shows the complexity comparison.
Both IBA-1 and IBA-2 show improvements in computational savings and decoding delay over BA-1 and BA-2, respectively. Relative improvement in the case of IBA-1 is more apparent compared to the improvement in the case of IBA-2. The IBA-1 has the smallest delay of all and the least hardware requirement. Since the IBA-1 requires simple control circuitry, it is preferable for small values of t and n. The IBA-2 has the smallest number of computations of all and marginally higher delay than the IBA-1. Hardware complexity of the IBA-2 is greater compared to the IBA-1. Therefore, the IBA-2 is preferable for large values of t and n. The MSTD has a larger number of computations compared to the IBA-2 and the longest delay of all. The MSTD may be used for moderate values of t and n, if the decoding delay is not stringent. It is to be noted that as the MSTD has to do 1-D DFT computation of either all the rows or columns, the time-domain implementation of the B-M algorithm for 2-D BCH decoding is not as advantageous as the time-domain implementation in the 1-D case.
X. CONCLUSIONS
We have presented deconvolution viewpoint for studying DFT domain decoding algorithms and applied it to obtain an alternative exposition of decoding algorithms for 2-D BCH codes. Some modifications to efficiently implement Blahut's decoding algorithm for 2-D BCH codes are suggested. It is shown that the modified algorithm requires at most half the number of passes compared to Blahut's original decoding algorithm. Improved versions of Blahut's decoding algorithms are given for correction of random and burst errors. Errorcorrecting capability of the class of 2-D BCH codes is determined and it is shown that Blahut's decoding algorithms correct up to their error-correcting capability. We have also given mixed spectral and time-domain implementation of 2-D BCH decoding algorithms and compared various decoding algorithms for the class of 2-D BCH codes with respect to computation and implementation complexities.
Some specialized class of 2-D BCH codes along with their decoding algorithms based on the idea of this correspondence, are given in [8] . These results will be communicated separately in a forthcoming paper.
proved to be NP-hard. It seems most unlikely that a polynomialtime algorithm for solving it exists. However, it does not imply that no general algorithm which runs faster than the exhaustive search can be discovered. Finding an efficient algorithm for computing a minimum-weight word in a linear code has in fact some important consequences both in cryptography and in coding theory. Such an algorithm actually constitutes an attack against a whole class of cryptosystems which rely on the hardness of decoding or on finding a minimum-weight codeword in a large linear code with no visible structure. The most famous are McEliece and Niederreiter publickey systems [2] , [3] -which are equivalent from the security point of view-and the identification schemes proposed by Stern [4] and by Véron [5] . This class of public-key systems is at the moment the only alternative to the common algorithms based on number theory which resists the cryptanalysis. Twenty years after the fundamental paper of Diffie and Hellman, public-key cryptography has in fact become dangerously dependent on only two problems: integer factoring and discrete logarithm. Studying the security of these systems based on algebraic error-correcting codes therefore seems essential in order to anticipate a possible important progress in factoring methods, for example. Any improvement of the algorithms for finding a minimumweight word in a general linear code consequently conditions the security of these cryptosystems and it delimits the parameters which could make them insecure. The motivations for searching for such an algorithm in coding theory are slightly different. This mainly aims at verifying or at establishing some conjectures on the minimum distance of some particular linear codes. For instance, there are several well-known families of codes for which only a lower bound on the minimum distance is known. It is then of great interest to determine whether such a bound is tight and to detect a specific behavior of some of these codes regarding their weight distribution. Among such families of codes we especially focus here on the primitive narrow-sense BCH codes.
In this correspondence we present a new probabilistic algorithm for finding minimum-weight words in any linear code. It associates a heuristic proposed by Stern and an iterative procedure stemming from linear programming. We give a very precise analysis of the complexity of this algorithm which enables us to optimize the parameters it depends upon. Hence our algorithm is to our knowledge the best procedure for decoding without using the structure of the code. Section II describes our algorithm for binary codes but it could be generalized to linear codes over GF (q) (see [6] ). Using Markov chain theory we show in Section III how to compute the number of elementary operations it requires; this enables us to determine the parameters which minimize this theoretical running time. We then give in Section IV some experimental results for decoding [256; 128]-binary linear codes which validate the earlier theoretical approach. Section V is dedicated to the specific problems of decoding and finding a minimum-weight codeword in a random [n; k]-binary code.
Two applications of our algorithm are finally discussed: we point out its consequences for the security of some cryptosystems based on error-correcting codes like McEliece public-key system, and we give new results for the true minimum distance of some narrow-sense BCH codes of length 511.
II. DESCRIPTION OF THE ALGORITHM
As usual wt (x) will denote the Hamming weight of the binary word x.
Let C be a linear binary code of length n, dimension k, and minimum distance d about which nothing is known but a generator matrix. We now develop an algorithm for finding a word of weight w in C where w is close to d. Since the main motivation of such a research is to attack McEliece's cryptosystem, most of the previous works are described as decoding algorithms. But they can easily be transformed in order to solve the problem of finding a codeword of low weight. The first algorithm given by McEliece himself in his first security analysis of his cryptosystem [2] is equivalent to the information set decoding procedure. It was later improved by Lee and Brickell [7] . Independently, Leon [8] and Stern [9] also gave some algorithms for solving this problem.
A. The Probabilistic Method
Enumerating randomly selected codewords in hope that one of weight w will be found is obviously not a suitable algorithm because the probability that the weight of a random codeword will be w is very small. It is then necessary to bias this random selection by only examining codewords verifying a given property so that their weight will be a priori small, for example, codewords which vanish on a randomly chosen coordinate subset. The problem is therefore to find a tradeoff between the number of operations required for searching such particular codewords and the success probability, i.e., the probability that the weight of such a codeword will be w.
All algorithms for finding short codewords use therefore the same method: they are in fact generalizations of the well-known information set decoding method.
Let N = f1; 1 1 1 ; ng be the set of all coordinates. For any subset I of N, G = (V; W )I denotes the decomposition of matrix G onto I, that means V = (Gi)i2I and W = (Gj) j2NnI , where Gi is the ith column of matrix G. From now on we index the rows of Z with I since G = (Id k ; Z) I is a generator matrix for the code and we denote by Z i the ith row of matrix Z.
The basic idea proposed by Lee and Brickell [7] consists in randomly selecting at each iteration an information set I and in examining all codewords having at most p nonzero bits in I, where the parameter p usually equals 1 or 2. These codewords actually correspond to the linear combinations of at most p rows of the corresponding systematic generator matrix (Id k ; Z)I.
Instead of computing the weight of all these linear combinations, which is a time-consuming procedure, Leon [8] suggested that this algorithm should be first applied to a punctured code C 0 composed of the information set I and a selection L of redundant positions, where is small-no more than 20 positions for codes of length around 500 or 1000. When a low-weight codeword in this punctured code is found the total weight of the corresponding word of the initial code C is then computed.
The probabilistic algorithm proposed by Stern [9] is slightly different but it was shown to give the best results [10] . It also consists in randomly choosing at each iteration an information set I which is split into two parts I 1 and I 2 of same size, and a subset L of redundant positions. We only examine codewords c verifying the following property:
wt (c jI ) = wt (c jI ) = p and wt (c jL ) = 0
(1)
until we find such a particular codeword whose restriction on JnL has weight w 0 2p.
All codewords which satisfy condition (1) can easily be constructed from the systematic generator matrix G = (Id k ; Z) I :
• randomly split the rows of Z into two subsets Z1 and Z2 corresponding to I 1 and I 2 ; • randomly select a -element subset L of the redundant set J;
• for each linear combination 31 of p rows of matrix Z1, compute 3 1jL ; • for each linear combination 3 2 of p rows of matrix Z 2 , compute 3 2jL ;
• if 3 1jL = 3 2jL , check whether wt ((3 1 + 3 2 ) jJnL ) = w 0 2p.
Both p and are parameters of the algorithm.
B. The Iterative Procedure
All the previous algorithms therefore explore a set of randomly selected information sets by performing at each iteration a Gaussian elimination on an (n 2 k)-generator matrix. But computing the complexity of these algorithms points out that their most expensive step is the Gaussian elimination. In order to avoid this timeconsuming procedure, we here propose to choose at each step the new information set by modifying only one element of the previous one. This method is analogous to the one used in the simplex method as suggested in [11] - [13] . As any two information sets can be joined by a sequence of close information sets, we use this iterative method in order to find one which enables us to exhibit a codeword of weight w. The following proposition shows how to choose and such that I 0 is still an information set. As the columns indexed by I are linearly independent, G and (G i ) i2Infg are linearly independent if and only if z ; = 1.
As the probabilistic method only deals with the redundant part of the systematic generator matrix, we only need a procedure to be able to obtain the redundant matrix Z 0 corresponding to I 0 from Z. 
C. Description of the Iterative Algorithm
Using this iterative procedure then leads to the following algorithm:
Initialization:
Randomly choose an information set I and apply a Gaussian elimination in order to obtain a systematic generator matrix (Id k ; Z) I .
Until a codeword of weight w will be found:
• randomly split I in two subsets I1 and I2 where jI1j = bk=2c and jI 2 j = dk=2e. [ fg by updating matrix Z according to the preceding proposition.
III. THEORETICAL RUNNING TIME
We give here an explicit and computable expression for the work factor of this algorithm, i.e., the average number of elementary operations it requires. This analysis is essential for finding the values of parameters p and which minimize the running time of the algorithm.
A. Modeling of the Algorithm by a Markov Chain
The average number of iterations performed by the algorithm is not the same as the one performed by the initial Stern's algorithm since the successive information sets are not independent anymore. Hence the algorithm must be modeled by a discrete-time stochastic process.
Let c be the codeword of weight w to recover and supp (c) its support. Let I be the information set and I1, I2, and L the other selections corresponding to the ith iteration. The ith iteration can then be represented by a random variable X i which corresponds to the number of nonzero bits of c in I. This random variable then takes its values in the set f1; 11 1;wg. But if this number equals 2p
we have to distinguish two cases depending of whether condition (1) is satisfied or not. The state space of the stochastic process fXig i2N N N is therefore :
The initial probability vector 0 is
The only persistent space of this Markov chain, i.e., a maximal state subset which cannot be left once it is entered, exactly corresponds to the success space S. Since this subset contains only one state which is an absorbing state, i.e., a state which once entered is never left, this chain is by definition an absorbing chain.
A basic property of absorbing Markov chains with a finite state space is that, no matter where the process starts, the probability that the process is in an absorbing state after n steps tends to 1 as n tends to infinity. We then deduce that our algorithm converges.
1) Expected Number of Iterations:
The absorbing chain property also enables us to compute the average number of iterations performed by the algorithm. For any finite absorbing chain we can define its fundamental matrix introduced by Kemeny and Snell [14] .
Proposition 5 [14] : If fX i g i2 is a finite absorbing Markov chain with transition matrix P , and Q is the substochastic matrix corresponding to transitions among the transient states-the nonpersistent states-i.e., Q = (P u;v ) u;v2F then (Id 0Q) has an inverse R called the fundamental matrix of the chain and
The average number of iterations performed by the algorithm can then be deduced from the fundamental matrix. 2) Variance of the Number of Iterations: The fundamental matrix also gives the variance of the number of iterations, which estimates the deviation from the average work factor of the effective computational time required by the algorithm.
Theorem 2:
The variance of the number of iterations N required until fX i g i2 reaches a success state is given by: 3) Distribution of the Iteration Number: Besides the average iteration number we often want to estimate the probability that the algorithm will succeed after a fixed number of iterations. But the approximation given by the Tchebychev's inequality is usually very rough. A much more precise evaluation is obtained by raising the transition matrix of the Markov chain to the corresponding power. We actually have:
Proposition 6: Let P be the transition matrix of the Markov chain associated with the algorithm. If P = L 01 3L, where 3 is a diagonal matrix, then the probability that the algorithm will succeed after N iterations is given by
B. Average Number of Operations by Iteration
We now give an explicit expression of the average number of operations performed at each iteration.
1) There are exactly k=2 p linear combinations of p rows of matrix Z1 (respectively Z2); computing each of them on a -bit selection and putting it in the hash table requires p binary additions.
2) The average number of collisions, i.e., the average number of pairs (3 1 ; 3 2 ) such that (3 1 + 3 2 ) jL = 0 is equal to ( ) 2 
where E(N ) is given by Theorem 1 and p; by (2).
Since each term in the previous expression can be explicitly computed, we are now able to determine the parameters p and which minimize the work factor required by the algorithm when the size of the code and the weight w of the searched codeword are given. Such a theoretical expression of the work factor is commonly used to assess the efficiency of an algorithm and to decide whether a given problem is computationally feasible. It is also applied to the automatic optimization of the parameters. But computer architectures, implementations, and compiler optimizations introduce some variations in the effective number of elementary operations performed at each iteration that cannot be evaluated in a precise way. The sharpest optimization can then only be performed by replacing in (3) the theoretical value of p; by the effective average CPU time of an iteration. Proposition 7 precisely estimates the computational cost for decoding and for finding a minimum-weight codeword once the parameters of the algorithm are optimized. But computing the average number of iterations with the transition matrix of the Markov chain is not very practical especially since this computation has to be performed for many different parameters. It would then be desirable to have an explicit formula which gives the work factor of the optimized algorithm as a function of the size of the code. Hence we establish here an approximation of this work factor for two classical problems: decoding a random linear binary code up to its correction capability and searching for a minimum-weight word in such a code. These results notably allow to immediately determine whether trying to decode or to find a minimum-weight word in a given code is realistic or not.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS

A. Decoding Random Linear Codes
We first consider the problem of decoding a random linear binary code of length n and dimension k up to its error-correcting capability, which is obtained by the Gilbert-Varshamov bound. Note that the code we consider for computing the work factor is an [n; k + 1]-code. Table II gives the optimal parameters of the algorithm and the corresponding work factors required for decoding some codes with expansion rate R = k=n = 0:5.
We see in Fig. 1 that, for a fixed expansion rate R, log 2 (W ) linearly depends on n when parameters p and are optimized and that the work factor can be written in the form W opt ' 2 na(R)+b . Fig. 2 shows how parameters p and act on the work factor involved in decoding a random [n; n=2] code: if they are not optimized, log 2 (W ) does not linearly depend on n any more. 
B. Finding Minimum-Weight Codewords
We now give an approximation of the theoretical complexity of the algorithm for recovering a word of weight d in a random [n; k]-binary code, where d equals the Gilbert-Varshamov bound. We assume that all these codes contain exactly one minimum-weight word. Table Fig. 4 . Evolution of the theoretical work factor with optimized parameters for finding a minimum-weight word in random [n; nR]-binary codes.
III now gives the optimal parameters of the algorithm for finding a minimum-weight word in some random [n; n=2]-linear binary codes.
As for the decoding problem log 2 (W opt ) linearly depends on n for a fixed expansion rate R = k=n (see Fig. 4 ). If this work factor is written in the form W opt ' 2 nc(R)+d , Fig. 5 shows that c(R) is closest to the translated entropy function cH 2 (R + R 0 ). 
VI. APPLICATION TO THE CRYPTOSYSTEMS BASED ON ERROR-CORRECTING CODES
Our algorithm constitutes the most efficient known attack against the class of public-key cryptosystems based on the hardness of decoding or on finding a minimum-weight word in a large code. 
A. McEliece's and Niederreiter's Cryptosystems
McEliece's cryptosystem uses as a secret key a linear binary code chosen in a family 0 of [n; k]-linear codes with error-correcting capability t for which an efficient decoding algorithm is known. In his original paper [2] , McEliece proposed to choose this secret code among the irreducible binary Goppa codes of length 1024, dimension 524, and minimum distance 101.
• Private key: it is composed of an [n; k]-linear binary code C chosen in the family 0, a random k 2k binary invertible matrix S, and a random n 2 n permutation matrix P . • Public key: it consists of the k 2 n matrix G 0 defined by G 0 = SGP where G is a generator matrix of the secret code C. Matrix G 0 is then a generator matrix for another [n; k]-linear code C 0 which is equivalent to C.
• Encryption: the ciphertext corresponding to the k-bit message m is x = mG 0 + e, where e is a random n-bit error vector of weight t.
• Decryption: the decryption procedure consists in computing xP 01 = mSG + eP 01 and using a fast decoding algorithm for C to recover mS. The message is then given by m = (mS)S 01 .
A ciphertext in McEliece's cryptosystem then corresponds to a word of the public code C 0 with t corrupted positions.
Niederreiter proposed a dual version of this system [3] where the public key is a parity-check matrix H 0 of a code C 0 equivalent to the secret code. A plaintext m is here an n-bit vector of weight t and the associated ciphertext x corresponds to the syndrome of m relatively to the public code, x = mH 0t . (31) . The parameters of both of these codes are obviously too small for the cryptosystem to be secure as shown by Brickell and Odlyzko [15] .
1) Comparisons Between McEliece's and Niederreiter's Systems:
McEliece's and Niederreiter's cryptosystems are actually equivalent from the security point of view when set up for corresponding choices of parameters [16] . But for given parameters Niederreiter's cipher presents many advantages.
• It allows a public key in systematic form at no cost in security, whereas this would reveal a part of the plaintext in McEliece's system. The public key in Niederreiter's system is then (n0k)=n times smaller than in McEliece's version.
• The systematic form of the public matrix H 0 and the low weight of vector m significantly reduce the computational cost easy to recover the plaintext if it has been encrypted twice with the same key (see [17] ). Niederreiter's cipher is, on the contrary, deterministic since encrypting a given plaintext always leads to the same ciphertext. A precise evaluation of the complexity of the encryption and decryption procedures for both of these systems is given in [17, ch. 2] . Table IV sums up their characteristics when they both use [1024; 524; 101]-binary codes. We give for information the values corresponding to the RSA system with a 1024-bit modulus n = pq when the public exponent is 17-we here suppose that RSA encryption and decryption uses Karatsuba's method for large integer multiplication. These results finally show that it is preferable to use the version proposed by Niederreiter. They also point out that this public-key system runs much faster than the RSA. Its main disadvantages are the size of the public key and the lack of related signature scheme.
2) Cryptanalysis Methods: There are mainly two guidelines to cryptanalyze McEliece's cryptosystem:
• recover the original structure of the secret code from a generator (or parity-check) matrix of an equivalent code; • decode the public code which has no visible structure. The first class of attacks imposes some conditions on the family of secret codes 0. It must in fact satisfy the following properties. 1) For given length, dimension, and minimal distance, the family 0 is large enough to avoid any enumeration.
2) An efficient decoding algorithm is known for this family. 3) A generator or parity-check matrix of a permutation equivalent code gives no information about the structure of the secret code, that means the fast decoding algorithm requires some parameters of the secret code besides a generator matrix G 0 .
The first condition on the size of 0 aims at protecting the system from the attack which consists in enumerating all the elements of 0 until a code equivalent to the public code is found. This can be performed with an algorithm due to Sendrier [18] that is able to determine from two generator matrices whether they correspond to equivalent codes and then to recover the permutation. This algorithm can be applied when the automorphism group of the code is trivial.
Finding the permutation between two [1000; 500]-equivalent binary codes then requires around 2 s on a workstation DEC 500/266 and noting that the codes are not equivalent is even faster. The third condition is the most restrictive: it actually dismisses many families of codes. For example, generalized Reed-Solomon codes are not convenient because their structure can be recovered using Sidelnikov-Shestakov algorithm [19] ; concatenated codes which were initially suggested by Niederreiter are not appropriated either [20] , [21] . But the family of irreducible Goppa codes is well-suited to such systems insofar as there actually exists no algorithm which is able to compute the characteristic parameters of a Goppa code from one of its permuted generator matrix. This class can even be extended to all [1024; 524; 101]-binary Goppa codes defined by a monic square-free polynomial of degree 50 in GF (1024)[X] which has no root in GF (1024). The cardinality of 0 is then 2 498:5 .
In the case the used family of codes satisfies the above properties, the equivalent code C 0 defined by the public key presents no particular structure; recovering a plaintext from the corresponding ciphertext then comes down to decoding any linear code.
B. Stern's Public-Key Identification Scheme
Stern presented at Crypto'93 [4] a public-key identification scheme which relies on the hardness of finding a small-weight codeword of a given syndrome. This scheme uses an [n; k]-random linear code over GF (2) . All users share a fixed parity-check matrix H for this code and an integer w slightly below the expected value for the minimal distance of a random linear code. Each user receives a secret key s which is an n-bit vector of weight w. His public key is then the syndrome sH t . Any user can identify himself to another one by proving he knows s without revealing it, thanks to an interactive zero-knowledge protocol. The minimal parameters proposed by Stern are n = 512, k = 256, and w = 56.
Véron [5] also proposed a dual version of this scheme similar to McEliece's original approach: it uses a generator matrix of the code instead of a parity-check matrix. He then suggested a new choice of the parameters in order to reduce the number of transmitted bits: n = 512, k = 120, and w = 114. unfeasible but it runs 128 times faster than Lee-Brickell's attack [7] . These results also show that reducing the size of the public key by using some codes of length less than 1024 is not conceivable: decoding a [512; 260]-binary Goppa code up to its error-correcting capability, for instance, requires only 2 40:1 binary operations.
C. Work Factor Required by Our Algorithm for the Cryptanalysis
A simple method for speeding up the cryptanalysis is to parallelize the attack by performing several decodings together as suggested in [10] and [22] . But the more decodings are performed together, the more operations have to be done in each iteration. 14 computers would lead to the same result. With our algorithm, a network of 3000 computers yields a better result. However, the standard deviation of the number of iterations involved in cryptanalyzing all these systems roughly equals its average. This spread implies that an unfeasible average work factor is not sufficient to guarantee that these cryptosystems are secure: it is necessary to estimate the probability that our algorithm will be successful after a feasible number of iterations. This can be done by raising the transition matrix of the associated Markov chain to the corresponding power as described in Proposition 6. We then obtain that the work factor required for decoding a [1024; 524; 101]-binary code up to its error-correcting capability only represents 69% of the average work factor. And if the work factor is limited to 2 51 , i.e., to 10 8 iterations, the probability that a message in McEliece's cipher will be decrypt is 10 04 . Since 1000 iterations of the optimized algorithm are performed in 10 min on a workstation DEC alpha 500/266, decrypting one message out of 10 000 requires two months and 25 days with ten such computers (see Fig. 6 ). The proportion of decrypted messages in a reasonable time is therefore relatively high as long as the enemy has a few ten fast workstations. A similar study shows that the parameters proposed in Stern's identification scheme make it much more secure (see Fig. 7 ). An eleven-month computation time on ten DEC alpha 500/266 enables us to recover the secret key of a user in only one case out of 100 000. This only implies that the lifetime of the keys must be less than one year. The parameters proposed by Véron significantly reduce the number of transmitted bits in each identification procedure but they impose a much shorter lifetime of the keys since 56 days on ten of our workstations are sufficient to find the secret key of a user with a probability greater than 1=3500. 
D. Partial Attacks on McEliece's and Niederreiter's Cryptosystems
McEliece's and Niederreiter's cryptosystems otherwise present some weaknesses since the knowledge of a small number of bits of the plaintext is sufficient to recover it in its entirety. The knowledge of some plaintext bits in McEliece's cipher allows to accordingly reduce the dimension of the code we consider in the attack. If we assume that 2 50 binary operations is a feasible work factor, it is then possible to decode up to distance 50 a [1024; 404]-binary code with our algorithm. This means that the knowledge of 120 plaintext bits (i.e., 23% of the plaintext) is sufficient to recover the whole plaintext in a reasonable time. A similar attack on Niederreiter's cryptosystem consists in assuming that some error positions are known by the enemy. The problem is then to determine the distance up to which a [1024; 524]-binary code can be decoded. Table VI shows that the knowledge of 15 error positions out of the 50 introduced in McEliece's and Niederreiter's systems enables us to recover the plaintext. This small proportion notably implies that generating the error vector with a noisy channel is insecure if this provides some errors whose weight is too small.
E. Optimization of the Parameters Used in McEliece's Cryptosystem
Adams and Meijer [23] have already noticed that using binary Goppa codes of length 1024 whose dimension is 524 as proposed by McEliece did not maximize the work factor of Lee-Brickell's attack. We now refine these parameters and we replace them by those which maximize the work factor of our algorithm, i.e., n = 1024; k = As noticed in Section V, the maximum work factor required for finding a minimum-weight word in a binary code is maximum when the expansion rate of the code equals 1=2. The parameters proposed by Stern are therefore optimal from this point of view.
VII. TRUE MINIMUM-DISTANCE OF BINARY NARROW-SENSE BCH CODES OF LENGTH 511
In this section we apply our algorithm to the narrow-sense BCH codes of length 511 since only a lower bound on the minimum distance is known for this famous class of cyclic codes. These codes have been intensively studied since 1959 and some sufficient conditions for this lower bound to be reached have been exhibited. But there is still no general method able to find their true minimum distance. Quite recently, Augot, Charpin, and Sendrier [24] completed the table which gives the minimum distance of BCH codes of length 255, but for the length 511 the true minimum distance of 12 narrowsense BCH codes is still unknown. In this context improving the knowledge of the minimum distance of relatively short BCH codes is a challenge. This is then a good way for testing the efficiency of such and such algorithm. But the main interest of any new numerical result is to suggest some important conjectures.
We here only consider primitive binary narrow-sense BCH codes. This construction immediately leads to a bound on the minimum distance d of B(n; ), named the BCH-bound: d . This bound is actually very strong since it is generally reached: the smallest primitive narrow-sense BCH code whose minimum distance is greater than its designed distance is B(127; 29) and it is the only one for this length. It is well known that the automorphism group of an extended primitive binary BCH code contains the affine group on GF (2 m );
we then have the following proposition. From the particular structure of BCH codes we can deduce that the designed distance is reached for several infinite classes of codes.
• Farr [25, p. 259] • If the minimum distance of B(n; ) equals its designed distance then the BCH bound is reached for all B(hn; h) [26] .
• Using the inclusion relations between BCH codes and punctured Reed-Muller codes, Kasami and Lin [27] [28] exhibited a codeword of weight or + 1 in some shortened codes of B(n; ).
• Augot and Sendrier [29] found some particular codewords of weight or + 1 among the idempotents of B(n; ), i.e., the words whose coefficients of the locator polynomial lay in GF (2) . Some methods also allow to show that the minimum distance of some BCH codes is greater than its designed distance:
• Kasami and Tokura [30] combined the inclusion of some BCH codes in a punctured Reed-Muller code and the divisibility of the weights of Reed-Muller codes. They therefore proved that some BCH codes have minimum distance + 2 and + 4.
• Augot, Charpin and Sendrier [24] found some cases where the BCH bound is not reached by exhibiting some contradictions in the Newton identities. But for binary primitive BCH codes it is usually conjectured that the true minimum distance does not exceed + 4.
After [24] the minimum distance was still unknown for 12 narrowsense BCH codes of length 511. We have then tried to find with our algorithm a word of weight equal to the designed distance or to + 1 in these codes and we have obtained the following result.
Theorem 3:
The minimum distance of the narrow-sense BCH codes of length 511 with designed distance 2 f29; 37; 41; 43; 51; 87g equals .
Proof: In each of these codes we found a word of weight + 1. Finding a codeword of weight + 1 is in fact easier than finding one of weight since the number of codewords of weight + 1 is (n 0 )=( + 1) times greater than the number of codewords of weight . Let be a primitive element in GF (2 9 ) defined by 9 + 4 + 1 = 0. The support of these codewords consists of the values i for the following exponents. Table VII gives the list of all narrow-sense BCH codes of length 511, their minimum distance, and the way they were found.
As shown in Section V, the computation time for finding a minimum-weight codeword increases when the expansion rate of the code is closer to 1=2. Finding a word of weight + 1 on a DEC alpha 3000/900 workstation actually required less than 1 min for B(511; 29) , three days for B(511; 37), and between one and three weeks for 2 f41; 43; 87g. A word of weight 52 in B(511; 52) was found after 50 days on 35 SPARC 5 workstations. A comparison of these computation times with the theoretical work factor of the algorithm points out that the number of minimum-weight words in these codes is very high. For instance only 35 377 iterations were performed for finding a word of weight 30 in B(511; 29) whereas 7:10 15 would be necessary if this code contained only one minimum-weight word.
A second remark is that we did not succeed in finding a word of weight 107 or 108 in B(511; 107) after 3 months whereas the algorithm should run 10 times faster than for B(511; 87). We then conclude that either the BCH bound is not reached for this code or the number of minimum-weight codewords is very small. This second assumption is moreover supported by a result due to Augot et al. [24] proving that the minimum-weight codewords of B(2 m 01; 2 m02 01) are those of the punctured Reed-Muller code of same length and order 2. This implies that the minimum-weight codewords in a primitive narrow-sense BCH code become scarcer when the designed distance is close to 2 m02 0 1.
These results finally suggest that the only BCH codes of length 511 for which the BCH bound may be not reached are those whose designed distance is close to 127.
